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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.- Case No. 8885 
KURT M. LYMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in the defendant's 
brief is fairly representative of the facts surrounding 
this case with the following exceptions: 
1. The defendant did enter a plea to the amended 
information in this action, and his plea to the charge 
contained ,therein was "not guilty." (R. 65). 
2. Contrary to defendant's allegation that the lower 
court denied his Motion to Quash filed on September 6, 
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1957, the lower court actually granted the defendant's 
Motion to Quash. However, the court then granted per-
mission for the District Attorney to amend the informa-
tion, to which amended information the defendant entered 
a plea of "not guilty." These proceedings were held be-
fore the Court on September 6, 1957, and the defendant 
appeared and was represented by his attorney, Elias 
Hansen, at that time. (R. 65). A copy of the amended 
complaint was then filed with the lower court on Septem-
ber 10, 1957. (R. 8). 
3. On February 20, 1958, the defendant was sen-
tenced but the execution of the sentence was suspended 
and the defendant was placed on probation for 18 months, 
subject to his compliance with the terms of the probation 
agreement. (R. 62). This sentence was not suspended, 
subject to the same being amended, as alleged in defend-
ant's statement of facts contained in his brief on appeal. 
The plaintiff adopts the statement of facts as set 
forth in defendant's brief subject to the above noted ex-
ceptions. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID GRANT THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION AND DEFEND-
ANT IS IN ERROR BY ·CLAil\IING THAT THE LOWER 
COURT REFUSED TO GRANT HIS MOTION TO QUASH; 
THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S ASSIGNMENT OR POINT I 
INVOLVES NO JUSTICIABLE ISSUE. (R. 65). 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO FILE ITS AMENDED INFORMA-
TION, AND FURTHERMORE, THE DEFENDANT FAILED 
TO MAKE HIS OBJECTION TIMELY IN THIS MATTER AND 
IS THEREFORE PRECLUDED FROM PURSUING HIS AP-
PEAL UPON THIS POINT. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING IN 
EVIDENCE EXHIBITS "B'' AND "C." 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
THE WITNESS, PAUL BLACK, TO ANSWER THE QUES-
TION: "WAS THERE ANY AUTHORIZATION MADE TO 
MR. LYMAN, OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON, BY THE BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS, AUTHORIZING THE PAYMENT FOR 
SOMETHING OTHER THAN FLOORING OR .CONTRACTS?" 
AS AMENDED BY ADDING THERETO "TO YOUR KNOWL-
EDGE?" 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
STRIKE THE EVIDENCE OF MR. BLACK THAT FERDI-
NAND ERICKSON WAS A DIRECTOR OF THE LYMAN 
MOTOR COMPANY. 
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POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
MR. BLACK, OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF COUNSEL FOR 
DEFENDANT, TO TESTIFY THAT WHEN HE AND MR. 
HARMON TOOK OVER THE MANAGEMENT OF THE LY-
MAN MOTOR COMPANY THERE WAS IN EX·CESS OF 
$5,000.00 OVERDRAFT AT THE BANK. INSOFAR AS THIS 
WITNESS FURTHER TESTIFIED AS TO THE FINANCIAL 
CONDITION OF THE LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY AT PAGES 
36-37 OF THE TRANSCRIPT, EACH AND EVERY ONE OF 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS WAS SUSTAINED THUS AF-
FORDING NO BASIS UPON WHICH DEFENDANT MAY 
APPEAL. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
MR. BLACK TO TESTIFY, OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL 
FOR DEFENDANT, THAT DEFENDANT WAS OWING TO 
THE LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD 
OF $800.00. 
POINT VIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
EXHIBIT "J" TO BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE OVER THE 
OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
STRIKE THE STATEMENT OF MR. ZENGER WHILE TESTI-
FYING FOR THE PLAINTIFF THAT THE SITUATION WAS 
BEYOND THE STAGE OF BEING CONTRACTS, AND WAS 
OF A CRIMINAL NATURE. 
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POINT X. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OVER OBJECTION OF COUN-
SEL FOR DEFENDANT, TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DE-
FENDANT AS TO CERTAIN CHECKS MADE OUT BY ,THE 
DEFENDANT TO VARIOUS OTHER PERSONS. 
POINT XI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT 
IN HIS REQUEST NO. 1. 
POINT XII. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT 
IN HIS REQUEST NO. 2. 
POINT XIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT 
IN HIS REQUEST NO. 4. 
POINT XIV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5, 
NOR DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GIVING ITS OWN 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5. 
POINT XV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 8. 
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POINT XVI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING ITS 
NINTH INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY. 
POINT XVII. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT. 
POINT XVIII. 
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID GRANT THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION AND DEFEND-
ANT IS IN ERROR BY ·CLAIMING THAT THE LOWER 
COURT REFUSED TO GRANT HIS MOTION TO QUASH; 
THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S ASSIGNMENT OR POINT I 
INVOLVES NO JUSTICIABLE ISSUE. (R. 65). 
The Court's attention is directed to the minute entry 
dated September 6, 1957 (R. 65) which reads as follows: 
"ARRAIGNl\IEKT. This was the tiine to 
which arraign1nent was heretofore continued on 
August 30, 1957. The defendant appeared and was 
represented by Elias Hansen, counsel. District 
Attorney Jackson B. Howard represented the 
State. The Infonnation was read and a copy 
thereof was handed to the defendant. The defense 
made a motion to quash the Information and the 
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court granted the motion. The District Attorney 
was granted permission to amend the Information. 
The District Attorney is to furnish a bill of par-
ticulars within ten days. To the charge contained 
in the amended Information the defendant entered 
a plea of 'not guilty,' and trial was ordered set 
for November 4, 1957, at 10:00 a.m. The defendant 
was released on bond heretofore furnished in this 
matter." (Emphasis added.) 
It is thus clear that the only Motion to Quash the Infor-
mation that was filed in this case was granted rather 
than denied as alleged by defendant. The defendant, hav-
ing received the benefit of the Court's ruling upon this 
point in the lower court, has obviously mistaken his posi-
tion upon this appeal. As a consequence there is no issue 
involved herein upon which this Court may exercise its 
judicial power. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO FILE ITS AMENDED INFORMA-
TION, AND FURTHERMORE, THE DEFENDANT FAILED 
TO MAKE HIS OBJECTION TIMELY IN THIS MATTER AND 
IS THEREFORE PRECLUDED FROM PURSUING HIS AP-
PEAL UPON THIS POINT. 
In answer to defendant's Assignment or Point II, we 
cite Section 77-17-3, U.O.A. 1953, as authority for the 
State's action in this regard. The pertinent portion of 
that statute reads as follows: 
"77-17-3. Amendments.-*** An information 
may be amended, without leave of court, in any 
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matter of form or substance at any time before 
the defendant pleads thereto. ••*" 
The minute entry set forth under Point I is indicative 
of the procedural fact that the defendant entered his plea 
of "not guilty" to the Amended Information, thus reveal-
ing that the amendment of the information in this case 
preceded the plea of defendant and was fully in accord 
with the above statute. 
The defendant claims that the Amended Complaint 
was vague, uncertain and calculated "to keep defendant 
in the dark as to the particulars of the nature and cause 
of the accusation against him." The Amended Complaint 
reads as follows: 
"Comes now Jackson B. Howard, District At-
torney of the State of Utah, and accuses Kurt M. 
Lyman, he having been bound over to answer this 
charge by a Committing Magistrate, and charges 
that the said Kurt l\L Lyman on or about the 15th 
day of April, 1957, in Utah County did commit the 
crime of a felony, to wit: Embezzlement, in that 
he did embezzle property in excess of $50.00 from 
the Lyman Finance Corporation." (R. 8). 
As part of defendant's argument, he states, at page 13 
of his brief on appeal, that this Court is committed to 
the following proposition of law: 
"1. That one charged with a crime may be 
bound over to the district court to answer only 
to the charge contained in the Complaint filed 
before the Com/lm.ffing Afagistrate, and upon which 
he has been given a preliminary hearing, unless 
such prelilninary hearing, with consent of the 
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State, is waived, or of an offense necessarily in-
cluded within the charged offense." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Therefore it certainly must have been defendant's under-
standing that he was being charged in the information 
with the same act or offense charged in the complaint, 
even though the exact language employed in the complaint 
was not incorporated in the information. Can it possibly 
be claimed that a charge of embezzling an amount in 
excess of $50.00 would not include the ultimate proof of a 
single act of embezzlement of $12,0001 And is this not 
especially so when the act upon which the conviction is 
obtained is the same as that charged in the original com-
plaint, and necessarily so 1 There could be no conviction 
under these circumstances for any other specific act 
of embezzlement than that named in the complaint. It 
necessarily follows that defendant was thus advised, dur-
ing the entire course of these proceedings, of the specific 
act upon which he was required to defend himself, and a 
contrary contention can be sustained only without the aid 
of logic. That defendant was so advised, in addition to 
the above, we cite the answers made to defendant's re-
quested Bill of Particulars which were served upon de-
fendant and the sufficiency of which was never challenged 
by defendant until he undertook this appeal. By his own 
conduct defendant acknowledged that his informational 
objectives were satisfied by this document. This makes 
his position untenable upon this appeal insofar as he 
claims uncertainty as to the particulars of the accusation 
against him. This Bill of Particulars, in addition to the 
original complaint and amended information, must have 
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been the basis upon which defendant prepared his defense 
inasmuch as he admits that it was not until he processed 
his appeal that he discovered the Bill of Particulars had 
not been filed with the Court as required by Section 77-21-
9, U.C.A. 1953, which provides, in part, as follows: 
"77-21-9. Bill of Particulars.-*** (5) When 
any bill of particulars is furnished it shall be 
filed of record and a copy of such bill be given 
to the defendant." 
The defendant had not, prior to this appeal, objected to 
the sufficiency or form of the Bill of Particulars furnish-
ed him in this case. His only objection now is that a copy 
was not filed with the Court. He does not allege that this 
in any way prejudiced him in his defense. This Court has 
held that the purpose of a bill of particulars is to inform 
defendant of the particulars of the offense sufficiently 
to enable him to prepare his defense. State v. Jameson, 
103 U. 129, 134 P.2d 173. This it did in the instant case 
irregardless of the fact that it ,,.,.as not filed with the 
Court. 
Furthermore, the Court instructed the jury as to the 
particular act charged against the defendant in its In-
struction No. 2 which reads, in part, as follows: 
"*** The particular property charged to have 
been embezzled is money of the Lyman Finance 
Corporation, represented by a check dated April 
15, 1957, in the sum of $12,000.00, made payable 
to Carlisle Corporation, and signed Lyman Fi-
nance Corporation~ by l{urt ~I. Ly1nan, President. 
""**" (R. 37). 
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It is absolutely clear from the above that the defendant 
was fully informed at every step in this prosecution of 
the particular offense, and specific act constituting that 
offense, with which he was charged, and his ultimate 
conviction was based solely upon the particular act of 
defendant in embezzling the sum of $12,000 from the 
Lyman Finance 'Corporation on April15, 1957, with which 
he was charged from the inception of this action. 
The defendant further relies upon the allegations of 
the original complaint as insufficient to inform him of 
the specific act with which he was charged. The complaint 
charged: 
"*** that Kurt M. Lyman on or about the 15th 
day of April, 1957, at Utah County, State of Utah, 
did commit the crime of a felony, to-wit: Em-
bezzlement, committed as follows: That he, the 
said Kurt M. Lyman, at the time and place afore-
said, did embezzle $12,000.00, the property of the 
Lyman Finance Corporation of Provo, Utah 
County, Utah, which said money had been en-
trusted with the said Kurt M. Lyman as officer 
for said Lyman Finance Corporation, and did 
appropriate the same to his own use." (Emphasis 
added.) 
It is argued by defendant that he could not reasonably 
anticipate that he would be called upon to defend an act 
of using the money of one corporation to pay the obliga-
tions of another under the emphasized portion of the 
complaint quoted above. However, to appropriate "to 
one's own use'' does not necessarily mean to one's per-
sonal advantage. Every attempt by one person to dispose 
of the goods of another, without right, as if they were 
his own is a conversion to his own use. 18 Am. Jur., Em-
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bezzlement, § 21. State v. Ross, 55 Ore. 450, 104 P. 596, 
106 P. 1022, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 601, (writ of error dis-
missed in 227 U.S. 150, 57 L. Ed. 458, 33 S. Ct. 220, Ann. 
Cas. 1914C, 224). Thus in a case similar to the one at bar, 
State v. Foust, 114 N:C. 842, 19 S.E. 275, the accused 
received a check as the property of one company, and 
applied it to the credit, not of that company, but of an-
other. The court in that case held that an indictment 
which charged that defendant "did convert to his own 
use, and embezzle" was sufficient and the court's instruc-
tion was proper that defendant was guilty if he received 
the check and misapplied it fraudulently, whether he con-
verted it to his own personal benefit or not. In the case 
of Sta,te v. Milbrath, 138 Wis. 354, 120 N.W. 252, 131 Am. 
St. Rep. 1012, the defendant, as a member of a firm en-
gaged in loaning money, received $300 from a client to 
loan on real estate security. The loan was made, the 
securities being taken in the name of a person from whom 
defendant held a general power of attorney and assigned 
by defendant to the client, the assignments not being 
recorded. A corporation was formed to take over the 
firm's business, which was controlled by the members 
of the finn. The loan was repaid to the corporation in 
defendant's presence when the corporation was insolvent, 
and was mixed with the corporation's funds and used by 
the corporation, which c.ontinued to pay interest upon 
the loan until it beca1ne bankrupt. The defendant and 
another corporation officer were charged in an informa-
tion with the embezzlement of said sum, and the unlawful 
and fraudulent conversion thereof to their own use. In 
response to the question whether the n1oney 'vas con-
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verted to their own use, as charged in the information, 
the court answered at page 255, 120 N.W. Reporter: 
"*** One may convert money of another to 
his own use by paying it out upon his private or 
personal debt. Guenther v. State (Wis.) 118 N.W. 
640. If this is true, he can convert the money to 
his own use by puttimg it into the treasury and 
mimgling it with the funds of an insolvent corpo-
ration which is under his control and management, 
and of which he is a stockholder and officer in 
charge. The benefit he receives in the first case 
by discharge of his personal debt is equal to the 
whole amount of the money so paid. The benefit 
which he receimes ~n the second oase is not equal 
to the whole amount of the money so paid. But 
the extent to which defendant was benefitted does 
not constitute the test. It is paid to his own use 
in either case. It is paid into that which is a 
mere instrumentality created by him under sanc-
tion of law, but as much under his control and as 
subservient to his will as the furniture of his office 
or the books of account in which he records his 
transactions. Under such circumstances, there is 
no room for the legal fiction of separate corporate 
personality or for distinction between the defend-
ant's acts as officer of the corporation and his 
acts as an independent natural person." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The Milbrath case is, in all legal respects, identical to the 
case at bar. The defendant in each case has converted 
money to the direct benefit of an insolvent corporation 
of which he was an officer and over which he exercised 
direct control. In each instance the defendant was 
charged with converting the alleged embezzled property 
to his own use. It therefore follows, as in the Milbrath 
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case, that the complaint in this case was not defective 
for charging a conversion to the defendant's own use 
in that such a charge does, in fact, include a conversion 
which constitutes an indirect benefit to the defendant 
by providing a direct benefit to an insolvent corporation 
over which the defendant has control and management. 
In addition to the above argument concerning the 
allegations of the complaint, we again direct the court's 
attention to the bill of particulars which was furnished 
the defendant in this case wherein the District Attorney 
informed the defendant that the state, insofar as proof 
of defendant's intention was concerned, would prove 
"criminal intention, particularly the intent to fraudu-
lently appropriate to his own use or to the use of some 
other person or corporation moneys or credits ,,~hich have 
come into his possession by virtue of his trust as an offi-
cer in the Lyman Finance Corporation.'' (Pages 3 and 4, 
Appellant's Brief). We reiterate that defendant at no 
time prior to his appeal objected to the sufficiency of 
tlris Bill of Particulars and the District Attorney's failure 
to file a copy thereof with the court was not prejudicial 
to the defendant's rights. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING IN 
EVIDENCE EXHIBITS "B'' AND "C." 
The most recent holding of tllis court upon tllis sub-
ject is to be found in the case of State v. Lack. 118 U. 128, 
221 P. 2d 852, wherein the court held that in a prosecution 
for embezzlement of bottles of whiskey during defend-
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ant's conduct of a package agency for the State Liquor 
Control Commission, evidence that defendant sold case 
lots of liquor to various clubs and split premium pay-
ments therefor with others was not inadmissible as show-
ing other offenses not pleaded, but was competent to show 
defendant's scheme or plan and intent to embezzle whis-
key. So here this evidence was admissible to show the 
chain of circumstances and the scheme or plan employed 
by the defendant in effecting the act of embezzlement 
with which he was charged. Although this check was 
signed by Paul C. Black, the Secretary and Treasurer of 
the Lyman Finance Company, it represented the first 
check drawn by that company, of which the defendant was 
then President and Director, for the alleged purpose of 
purchasing the "flooring" held by another finance cmn-
pany. Furthermore, the check was made payable to the 
Lyman Motor, Inc., which defendant managed as Presi-
dent. (Tr. 9-18). This was the first step in a well con-
ceived plan or scheme in the mind of the defendant to 
fraudulently appropriate another's money to extricate 
himself from threatened exposure for other fraudulent 
acts and was, therefore, admissible in evidence to shed 
light on that plan or scheme. 
In addition to the above it is clear that the defendant 
cannot complain that the admission of certain documen-
tary evidence introduced by plaintiff was prejudicial, 
where the defendant himself had testified to all the facts 
contained in the assailed exhibit. People v. Dunn, 40 
Cal. App. 2d 6, 104 P. 2d 119, certiorari denied 61 S. ·Ct. 
139, 311 U.S. 701, 85 L. Ed. 454. The evidence which 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
defendant would have this court disallow consists of 
a check in the amount of $6,000 issued by Lyman Finance 
Corporation, over the signature of Paul C. Black, pay-
able to Lyman Motor, Incorporated, as well as the check 
stub evidencing the payment made by this particular 
check. Yet the defendant himself described the check in 
detail and testified as to every material fact it contained. 
(Tr. 171-172). Under these circumstances the defendant 
cannot complain of the admission of this evidence for 
even if there were error in admitting this evidence it 
is cured by the defendant's admissions covering the 
same transactions. K reinbring v. United States ( C.A. 
Minn.) 216 F. 2d 671. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
THE WITNESS, PAUL BLACK, TO ANSWER THE QUES-
TION: "WAS THERE ANY AUTHORIZATION MADE TO 
MR. LYMAN, OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON, BY THE BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS, AUTHORIZING THE P A Y:JIENT FOR 
SOMETHING OTHER THAN FLOORING OR CONTRACTS?" 
AS AMENDED BY ADDING THERETO "TO YOUR KNOWL-
EDGE?" 
The defendant does not deny that Mr. Black was a 
director of the Lyman Finance Company and the testi-
mony affirms that fact. (Tr. 11, 24). As such he is charge-
able with knowledge of what transpires at meetings of 
the Board of Directors. Gay v. Young Men's Consol. 
Co-op. Mercantile Inst. et al., 37 U. 280, 107 P. 237. There-
fore, his parol evidence is admissible to prove a fact 
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where the fact to be proved is of such a character that it 
would not be shown by the corporate records. 32 ·C.J.S., 
Evidence, § 810 (a) ( 2). And the fact that the records of 
a corporation contain no entry relevant to the matter does 
not preclude parol evidence that certain action was not 
taken by the corporation. United Order of Golden Cross 
v. Hooser, 160 Ala. 334, 49 So. 354. Thus :Mr. Black, who 
was testifying from his own knowledge as a director of 
the corporation, was properly allowed to testify that 
the Board of Directors had not authorized "the payment 
for something other than flooring or contracts." And, 
contrary to defendant's contention, it was most material 
to determine the extent of the authority granted to the 
defendant by the Board of Directors, for the non-
existence of such authority becomes the essential ele-
ment in the determination of the existence of the crime 
as charged. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
STRIKE THE EVIDENCE OF MR. BLACK THAT FERDI-
NAND ERICKSON WAS A DIRECTOR OF THE LYMAN 
MOTOR COMPANY. 
It is well settled law that a director of a corporation 
who has failed to file his oath as required by statute 
is not a de jure officer, but as to third persons his acts 
as a de facto director are valid and binding, if otherwise 
legal, and the corporation, its officers and stockholders 
may, by acquiescence, become estopped from disputing 
such authority. Schwab v. Frisco Min. & Mxll Co., 21 
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U. 258, 60 P. 940. Therefore, Mr. Black's testimony that 
Ferdinand Erickson was a director of Lyman Finance 
Corporation was properly admitted in evidence over de-
fendant's motion to strike even though Mr. Erickson had 
not taken his oath of office. His failure to qualify as a 
de jure director could not effect his status as a de facto 
director. In fact, the de facto officer exists because of the 
failure of that officer to achieve de jure status. 
Furthermore, the evidence complained of m this 
assignment of error was not prejudicial to the defendant 
in any respect. Whether or not :\Ir. Erickson was a di-
rector of the corporation, either de jure or de facto, 
would have no possible effect upon the jury in its deter-
mination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, nor 
could it have confused the jury and cast upon the defend-
ant a suspicion of wrongdoing not connected with the 
crime charged because there is not a scintilla of malfeas-
ance to be i1nputed from the fact that this man was a 
director of the corporation. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
MR. BLACK, OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF COUNSEL FOR 
DEFENDANT, TO TESTIFY THAT WHEN HE AND MR. 
HARMON TOOK OVER THE MANAGEMENT OF THE LY· 
MAN MOTOR COMPANY THERE WAS IN EXCESS OF 
$5,000.00 OVERDRAFT AT THE BANK. INSOFAR AS THH 
WITNESS FURTHER TESTIFIED AS TO THE FINANCIAl 
CONDITION OF THE LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY AT PAGEf 
36-37 OF THE TRANSCRIPT, EACH AND EVERY ONE 01 
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DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS WAS SUSTAINED THUS AF-
FORDING NO BASIS UPON WHICH DEFENDANT MAY 
APPEAL. 
This court has held, in accordance with the majority 
rule, that evidence of accused's financial circumstances 
and expenditures at, or immediately before, the time of 
an alleged conversion in an embezzlement proceeding is 
relevant. Thus in the case of State v. Judd, 74 U. 398, 279 
P. 953, wherein a deputy county treasurer was charged 
with embezzling county funds, the court said, at page 957 
of 279 Pacific Reporter: 
"*** The practices of keeping the records and 
the handling of the money of the department was 
a proper subject for inquiry, and the question con-
cerning the financial stress of accused and his bet-
ting on horse races were relevant as bearing upon 
a motive for the commission of the acts by defend-
ant which the prosecution was attempting to 
prove." 
And it has been held that evidence of the desperate finan-
cial condition of a brokerage company was competent to 
f. prove motive or connection of its president with the em-
li bezzlement of proceeds from the sale of stock. State v. 
Cooke, 130 Ore. 552, 278 P. 936. 
It follows from the above authodties that the finan-
cial condition of the Lyman Motor Company, of which 
defendant was President, was competent evidence to 
prove the motive of the defendant in embezzling funds 
from another company which he also headed as President. 
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POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
MR. BLACK TO TESTIFY, OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL 
FOR DEFENDANT, THAT DEFENDANT WAS OWING TO 
THE LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD 
OF $800.00. 
Upon cross examination of Mr. Black by counsel for 
defendant it was inferred that the defendant had not 
personally received any money from the Lyman Finance 
Corporation because all moneys were paid to the Lyman 
Motor Company. (Tr. 48-49). Therefore it was proper, 
upon redirect examination, for the witness to testify that 
his examination of the financial records revealed a debit 
balance of $800 owing the Lyman :Motor Company by 
the defendant for money advanced, thus showing that 
defendant had access to the funds of the corporation for 
his own personal use. It is proper to question a witness 
on redirect examination to explain statements made on 
cross-examination. 32 ·C.J.S., Evidence, § 548 (a). 
POINT VIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
EXHIBIT "J" TO BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE OVER THE 
OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT. 
Exhibit J, an application to the Utah State Securities 
Commission for permission to sell stock to the public in 
Lyman Finance Corporation, provides that the proceeds 
from the sale of stock would be used for certain described 
purposes. It was properly admitted in evidence as part 
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of the general scheme or plan of defendant in making 
available the funds which were subsequently appropri-
ated to his own uses. State v. Lack, supra. Evidence that 
the proceeds from the sale of stock were not used for the 
purposes specifically mentioned in the application may 
be admitted to show the intent of the defendant in the 
commission of the offense with which the defendant 
stands charged. State v. Cooke, supra. The rule as stated 
in 29 C.J.S., Embezzlement,§ 41, is as follows: 
"Since from its nature intent is incapable of 
direct proof, great latitude is necessarily allowed 
in proving this element of the offense. Broadly 
speaking, any evidence is admissible which has a 
tendency, even the slightest, to establish fraudu-
lent intent on the one hand, or, on the other hand, 
to show the bona fides of the accused. *"" *" 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
STRIKE THE STATEMENT OF MR. ZENGER WHILE TESTI-
FYING FOR THE PLAINTIFF THAT THE SITUATION WAS 
BEYOND THE STAGE OF BEING CONTRACTS, AND WAS 
OF A ·CRIMINAL NATURE. 
The following is that portion of the trial transcript 
to be found from line 21, page 88, to line 7, page 89: 
Q. Was the security that was given to you suffi-
cient to pay off these fictitious contracts~ 
A. No sir. 
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Q. When you talked to Mr. Lyman did you tell 
him what you were going to do if they weren't 
paid~ 
A. I recall saying in his presence and in the pres-
ence of Mr. Car lisle, who I called to come down 
because of the seriousness of the situation, that 
this was beyond the stage of bum contracts, but 
it certainly was of a criminal nature and it re-
quired further action. 
MR. HANSEN: If the court please, we object to 
that as (and~) move that it be stricken, what Mr. 
Carlisle said. 
THE WITNESS : I said that in the presence of 
Mr. Lyman and Mr. Carlisle. 
MR. HOWARD: That is what he said. 
THE COURT: That is w·hat I understood. The 
motion to strike is denied. 
(Parenthetic phrase added.) 
It is immediately apparent from the transcript that the 
defendant's motion to strike \Yas aimed at what he 
thought to be hearsay evidence of what :Jir. Carlisle said. 
That not being the case the motion \Yas not well taken 
and was, therefore, proper}~- denied. A party wishing 
the benefit of an objection n1ust show how he is hurt. A 
rule of evidence not invoked is \Yaived. "rigmore on 
Evidence, Third Edition, § lS. The defendant cannot 
prevail upon appeal where he failed to state the rule of 
evidence upon which he relied in Inaking his objection to 
offered evidence in the trial proceeding. 
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POINT X. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OVER OBJECTION OF COUN-
SEL FOR DEFENDANT, TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DE-
FENDANT AS TO CERTAIN CHECKS MADE OUT BY THE 
DEFENDANT TO VARIOUS OTHER PERSONS. 
The defendant had testified that a certain list of 
contracts which had been assigned to the Carlisle Finance 
Company by the Lyman Motor Company contained some 
"valid" and some "incorrect" contracts. (Tr. 176-184). 
Thus it was entirely proper for the court to allow the 
District Attorney to impeach the testimony of the defend-
ant by showing the fraudulent nature of these contracts, 
and to question him concerning his knowledge of the dis-
position of the money represented by the checks in ques-
tion. As to the state's proffered Exhibits "P" and "Q" 
the defendant admitted signing them. (Tr. 200). The 
fictitious names or non-existent individuals named in 
these contracts and checks, and acknowledged as such by 
defendant (Tr.198-199), are examples of defendant's par-
ticipation in other fraudulent schemes and was, therefore, 
a proper subject of cross examination for the purpose 
of proving the intent, motive or scheme of defendant in 
committing the crime with which he was charged. State 
v. Lack, supra. The defendant cites the case of State v. 
Lanos, 63 U. 151, 223 P. 1065, as authority to sustain his 
position on this point. That case stands for the proposi-
tion that cross examination, even though objectionable, 
would not constitute reversible error in the absence of 
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objection or exception. It has no application to the matter 
herein considered. 
POINT XI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT 
IN HIS REQUEST NO. 1. 
The plaintiff incorporates its arguments under 
Points I and II in answer to Point XI contained in de-
fendant's brief. 
POINT XII. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT 
IN HIS REQUEST NO. 2. 
The plaintiff incorporates its argument under Point 
II, insofar as it relates to the appropriation of the prop-
erty to defendant's "own use," in answer to Point XII 
contained in defendant's brief. 
POINT XIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT 
IN HIS REQUEST NO. 4. 
In the case of State v. Anderson, 75 U. 496, 286 P. 
645, this court, upon which defendant's learned counsel 
was then a member, held that objections to instructions 
could not be considered on appeal without exceptions. 
This case was cited by the Court in a later case, State v. 
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Cooper, 114 U. 531, 201 P.2d 764, wherein it was held that 
an appeal would not be heard upon the alleged error of 
the lower court in refusing to give a requested instruc-
tion where no exception had been taken to the court's 
refusal to give such instruction. No exception was taken 
to the court's failure to give the requested instruction 
in the instant case, nor was the court's attention ever 
directed to the omission complained of herein until after 
the trial jury was discharged. Under these circumstances 
we do not feel that the lower court's failure to give the 
requested instruction constituted reversible error. 
Furthermore, the instructions of the court were ex-
plicit in this regard. In its Instruction No. 2, the court 
informed the jury that: 
"The particular property charged to have 
been embezzled is money of the Lyman Finance 
Corporation, represented by a check dated April 
15, 1957, in the sum of $12,000.00, made payable 
to Carlisle Corporation, and signed Lyman Fi-
nance Corporation, by Kurt M. Lyman, Presi-
dent." (R. 37). 
The same instruction charged the state with the burden 
of proving every material allegation to the jury's satis-
faction beyond reasonable doubt, and Instruction No. 3 
sets forth the material allegations upon which proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt would be required to sustain 
a conviction for embezzlement. Such material allega-
tions included the proof of the execution of the $12,000.00 
check by the defendant without authority for a purpose 
not in the due and lawful execution of his trust as an 
officer of the Lyman Finance Corporation. (R. 38). In-
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struction No. 17 charged the jury that unless it found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the $12,000.00 check was 
not paid for valid contracts for the sale of automobiles, 
it must find the defendant not guilty. (R. 49). Thus the 
jury was adequately instructed as to the acts which it 
was required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have 
existed as a matter of fact in order to sustain a verdict 
of guilty. These instructions leave no room for the jury 
to infer guilt for the crime charged from other acts, the 
proof of which was essential to show the scheme, plan, 
intent and motive of the defendant in committing the 
alleged crime. 
POINT XIV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5, 
NOR DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GIVING ITS OWN 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5. 
We incorporate herein our argument set forth under 
Point II, insofar as it relates to the appropriation to the 
defendant's "own use" of the funds in question, in answer 
to Point XIV contained in defendant's brief. 
POINT XV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.8. 
Defendant's requested instruction No. 8 is as follows: 
"You are instructed that the Articles of In-
corporation of the Lyman Finance Corporation 
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authorized the defendant, Kurt M. Lyman, to loan 
the money of the Lyman Finance Corporation to 
the Lyman Motor Company, and to borrow, on 
behalf of the Lyman Finance Corporation, money 
from the Carlisle Finance Company." 
The defendant contends that this instruction should have 
been given inasmuch as the Articles of Incorporation 
of the Lyman Finance Corporation granted the following 
powers to the corporation: 
"To borrow money and to execute notes and 
obligations and obligations and security contracts 
therefor, and to lend any of the money or funds 
of the Corporation and to take evidence of in-
debtedness therefor." (Emphasis added.) 
Surely the defendant recognizes that the powers of a 
corporation are to be exercised by its board of directors. 
Section 16-2-21, U.C.A. 1953, so provides. It is therefore 
elemental that, in the absence of any delegation of au-
thority by the Board of Directors at Lyman Finance 
Corporation, the defendant, even as the corporation's 
President, could not personally exercise the powers con-
ferred upon the corporation by its charter. Yet defend-
ant's requested instruction No. 8 would have charged 
the jury that defendant had such power. The requested 
instruction was, therefore, properly denied. 
We herewith add that no "evidence of indebtedness" 
was ever introduced in this proceeding to add credence 
to defendant's claim that the money was loaned other 
than the check itself. It is apparent that the powers con-
ferred upon the corporation by its Articles of Incorpora-
tion contemplated some "evidence of indebtedness" to be 
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taken in addition to the proceeds of a negotiated loan, 
even if such a loan were authorized by the corporation's 
board of directors. In fact, the defendant himself stated 
that he would not classify the money taken from the Ly-
man Finance Company as a loan. ( Tr. 213). 
POINT XVI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING ITS 
NINTH INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY. 
Our Supreme Court, in construing Section 16-2-21, 
U.C.A. 1953, supra, has held that a president of a corpo-
ration, as such, has ordinarily only such powers as are 
possessed by a director, or such powers as may be directly 
conferred upon him by the board of directors. Lochwitz 
v. Pine Tree Min. & Mill. Co., 37 U. 349, 108 P. 1128; 
Copper King lllin. Co. v. Hanson, 52 U. 605, 176 P. 623. 
And this is true notwithstanding a resolution of the 
stockholders vesting such officer with power. Anderson 
v. Grantsville North Willow Irr. Co., 51 U.137, 169 P. HiS. 
It is thus clear that the defendant, as President of Lyman 
Finance Corporation, had no power to loan the corpora-
tion's money, and the lower court's Instruction No. 9 
correctly set forth the powers of corporate directors and 
officers. We further incorporate our argmnent contained 
under Point XV in answer to the question here presented. 
POINT XVII. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT. 
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The amount of money supposedly advanced by the 
Lyman Motor Company to the Lyman Finance Corpora-
tion consisted primarily of Mr. Black's salary of $600 per 
month for a period of approximately three months. Even 
as to the payment of this sum, the defendant testified 
that he had no authority from the Board of Directors of 
the motor company authorizing him so to do. (Tr. 171, 
213-14). Other expenses claimed to have been advanced 
by the motor company to the finance company consisted 
of office space, etc. According to the defendant's own 
testimony, the total amount would be four or five thou-
sand dollars. (Tr. 213). Yet the motor company was 
paid $6,000 out of the first proceeds from the sale of 
stock of the finance corporation. (Tr. 17-18). Further-
more, the motor company received the benefit of checks 
in the amounts of $1,753.03 and $246.97 from the finance 
company to the Carlisle Corporation in addition to the 
$12,000 check upon which this case is based. (Tr. 19-21). 
Thus it is clear that no debtor-creditor relationship ex-
isted between the motor company and the finance com-
pany at the time of the alleged embezzlement, and cer-
tainly no such relationship existed between the finance 
company and the defendant, such as to remove this case 
from the embezzlement statutes. Furthermore, a charge 
of embezzlement is sustained by proof that the accused 
has received a sum of money as agent for another and 
converted the same to his own use even though a portion 
is applied to the satisfaction of a debt owed to him by 
the principal. State v. Peterson, 61 U. 91, 211 P. 694. 
The debtor-creditor exception has absolutely no applica-
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tion to this defendant's action. There is not one whit of 
evidence which would indicate that the finance company 
was indebted to the defendant for a single cent. There-
fore, defendant's Point XVII is without merit. 
POINT XVIII. 
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT A NEW TRIAL. 
By virtue of the foregoing arguments in answer to 
defendant's claimed errors, plaintiff submits that the 
lower court did not err in denying defendant a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant's appeal in this case should be denied 
and the verdict and judgment of the District Court in 
this matter should be affirmed. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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